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Soviet Union to be discovered by someone other than the author—in all probability by Gorbachev himself.

William Taubman

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Leites, Nathan. *Soviet Style in Management*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1984. xi, 111 pp. \$12.00.

“To present a fuller portrait of Soviet style in management,” writes Nathan Leites, “many other kinds of data besides those inspected below would have to be considered; and other researchers may perceive what escaped the author in the data with which he deals.” The “portrait” presented in Nathan Leites’s *Soviet Style in Management* is even less full than his modest disclaimer suggests. Relying on material drawn exclusively from three Soviet party publications—*Kommunist*, *Partiinaiia zhizn’*, and *Pravda*—what Leites has in fact presented is a limited analysis of the Party’s management of the economy.

Leites’s trademark emphasis on recurring “key terms” such as *pod’em* and *aktivnost’*, culled from hundreds of speeches and articles, may tell us something about how some in the Party view its ideological role, of “maintaining and enhancing the population’s ‘activeness’ at all levels,” but in contrast to such studies as William Conyngham’s *Industrial Management in the Soviet Union* and Jerry Hough’s *The Soviet Prefects*, it tells virtually nothing about the actual scope of Party involvement in economic decision-making.

What Leites does say about the scope of Party involvement in economic affairs is, furthermore, misleading. “The Party’s all-encompassing participation in economic activities,” he writes, “is, of course, alleged by the Kremlin to be a necessary or even sufficient condition of economic success.... (N)ot only does the Party determine the *rules* and *plans*... but the Party also, in aspiration and allegation, massively ‘interferes’ in the economy by a host of *particular* actions.” The impression Leites gives is: (a.) that massive Party interference in the economy is not perceived by the leadership as itself one possible cause of the present economic crisis; and (b.) that the principle of Party interference in microeconomic decision-making is fully accepted. One could argue in both cases that the opposite is true, or at least that the issue of the scope of Party involvement remains unresolved. Party involvement or “interference” in the economy in fact has historically been and remains for the Soviet leadership a central dilemma, what Conyngham calls “a choice between power and efficiency as competing values.” One could certainly find as many references in Soviet publications to the evils of *podmena* as to the wonders of *pod’em*. This observation brings me to several technical criticisms of *Soviet Style in Management*.

For those familiar with Leites’s past work, the book will come as no surprise, consisting largely of quotations strung together. There is nothing inherently wrong in this technique; the strength of Leites’s study is precisely how well he seems to cover his few sources. What limits the utility of the study, however, is the lack of an attempt on Leites’s part to evaluate his data. Each quotation is presented without regard to its validity or importance. What Mikhail Suslov had to say about the Party’s leading role is given no more importance than the utterances of a local party secretary or staff reporter for *Pravda*.

My second technical criticism concerns the quality of writing, editing, and translation. All fall short of the standards one would expect. The writing is frequently indecipherable, as in the following example: "Whereas, in this vein, 'the energy of the people' is 'boiling' by itself, it is in the Party top's usually secret belief the Party that 'develops the...energy of the masses'—not only by disinhibiting it and diverting it from unproductive and self-damaging 'spontaneous' directions to efficient ones, but even by instilling energy into the masses (from what fund is modestly not indicated)." Unfortunately, all too many sentences like this await readers of Leites's book.

Anne Stewart-Hill

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Evel'son, Evgeniia. *Sudebnye protsessy po ekonomicheskim delam v SSSR*. London: Overseas Publications, Ltd., 1986. 370 pp. £7.50.

Working from an analysis of 400 reported cases of economic crime (bribery, large-scale theft of state property and illegal trading in foreign currency) for the years 1961-67 and a selection of cases from her own practice at the Moscow Bar, the author concludes that even after Stalin's death Soviet policy called for execution of numbers of offenders and discrimination against Jews. Her statistics show that of 1676 Jewish offenders convicted, 163 were condemned to death. Further statistics from the Ukraine emphasize the discrimination: 68 Jews, but only five non-Jews, were executed in that republic.

She does not claim that innocent persons were convicted, but rather that sentences of death for economic crime were peculiar to the Soviet legal system and that Jews bore the brunt of the punishments. The trials are described against a background of Soviet mores. The author tells of the widespread corruption, even in high places, at the time. She lays this corruption to failure of the state to provide consumer goods; hence the second economy grew up. Taking advantage of the situation, artisans and small factories increased production, and, of course, they required raw materials. These could be obtained primarily from the state employees who stole them from their enterprises and bribed superiors to look the other way. The author's position seems to be that the offenders were only human under the circumstances and, although guilty of violation of the law, should not have been executed, the more so since the Soviet code defined death as an "exceptional penalty" and stated the purpose of penology to be rehabilitation, not retribution.

Proof of anti-Semitism is offered not only in statistics but in accounts of the trials, the most telling one ending with Evel'son's Jewish client condemned to death while the Russian enterprise director who was responsible escaped with a jail sentence. Unable to change the court's attitude, she focused on an effort to expose the discrimination to the public in the courtroom by emphasizing names and patronymics of the two accused men, but to no avail. Her client was executed.

She hints that judges' minds are made up before the conclusion of a trial and that nothing can change them. Her example is a case where the procurator decided that the facts supported a lesser offense and said so, but the judge called him forward during an intermission to ask that he withdraw his changed charge because the judgment had already been prepared.